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Abstract
This paper examines the responsiveness of investment to q (i.e., the ratio of a firm’s
market value to the replacement cost of its assets) using data on a unique type of firm:  Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).  For REITs, we have high quality estimates of the net asset
value of the firm that we use to create relatively accurate measures of Tobin’s q.  In addition,
REITs have institutional features that mitigate some of the complications faced by previous
studies.  We have three main results.  First, there is little evidence of a statistical link between
REIT investment and a traditional accounting-based measure of q.  Second, REIT investment is
highly sensitive to estimates of q that are based on analysts’ appraisals of asset value.  A REIT
whose NAV-based q ratio rises from 1.0 to 1.1 will increase its assets by 4.3 percent in the next
year.  Third, the difference between the appraisal-based measure of q and the traditional
accounting based measure typically increases with the age of the firm’s assets and varies across
types of properties.  These results suggest that measurement error in q can lead to appreciable
downward biases in investment sensitivities, even in an industry that seems to meet many of the
assumptions in Tobin’s original paper, but that Tobin’s investment model performs well with a
better measure of q.1 REITs owned just 7 percent of all commercial real estate as of 9/20/2002 (National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts, Lend Lease/PricewaterhouseCoopers) and have a relatively small penetration in
most major markets and property types.  Even for regional malls, the property sector with the largest
REIT penetration, REITs own just over 42 percent of the malls in the US, and that ownership is divided
among more than a dozen REITs (source: Merrill Lynch, 10/29/2001). Other property sectors such as
apartments, offices, and strip centers have REIT market penetrations that are no more than 8 percent.
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I. Introduction
Traditional q-theory models describe the optimal level of investment subject to
adjustment costs.  Despite providing a simple and elegant prediction that investment should
depend on the market value of an investment project relative to the cost of undertaking the
project, as discussed below, empirical support for this prediction has been difficult to find and
the estimated sensitivity of investment to q has appeared quite small.  
In this paper, we consider Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).  REITs provide a
natural place to examine how investment responds to stock market value because several
institutional features mitigate some of the complications facing other studies.  For example,
since REITs do very little advertising or research and development, we sidestep the issues
associated with valuing intangible assets for measuring investment incentives.  Furthermore,
REITs have relatively little market power.
1  Finally, REITs may face fewer adjustment costs than
other firms because most of their assets are not firm-specific; instead, other potential owners
would have a similar value for their assets.  With a competitive market for buildings, mostly
tangible assets, and relatively low adjustment costs, we would expect that Tobin’s original model
of investment and q should hold reasonably well for REITs, and possibly better than for
industrial firms.
At the same time, REITs also have some disadvantages related to the measurement of the
replacement cost of their assets.  Most studies of Tobin’s q use the book value of assets as a2 Of course, one would like to generate such a measure for other industrial firms, but it is considerably
more difficult.  In a few cases, analysts attempt to do a comparable analysis by estimating the value of oil
and gas companies based on the amount of their proven reserves multiplied by current oil and gas prices. 
Some pharmaceutical analysts will estimate the value of corporate assets based on the value of a drug
portfolio.  This type of analysis is often used to assess management’s performance by comparing the
market value of a firm to the break-up value of a firm if its divisions were sold separately, an analysis that
is in the same spirit as Tobin’s original model.
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proxy for the replacement cost of a firm’s assets.  Yet, the book value of assets often does not
equal the replacement cost of assets.  During peak times of demand, existing equipment may
have a market value that exceeds its book value, while at other times equipment might fall
appreciably when, for example, manufacturers offer a new generation product or demand falls. 
For example, consider the airline industry.  Today, the market value of aircraft is well below the
book value of aircraft because demand for air travel has fallen substantially; however, just four
years ago, aircraft had a very high value and airplane manufacturers were unable to meet the
then-current demand.  In addition, inflation affects how well historical book values approximate
current market values for assets.  For real estate, building values can rise or fall appreciably due
to changes in supply or demand in particular markets and for specific property types. 
With REITs, we circumvent this problem by using an alternative measure of the
replacement cost of assets based on analyst estimates of the market value of a REIT’s buildings
rather than the book value of a REIT’s assets.  This strategy is feasible for REITs because, by
law, most of their assets must be real estate, which is relatively easy for outside analysts to
appraise – at least compared to the assets of other corporations.  These analyst appraisals help us
generate an estimate of Tobin’s q that is arguably more accurate than the measures based on the
book value of assets that researchers have used for industrial firms.
2 3 See, e.g., Bond and Cummins (2000) and the cites given in section III on previous estimates.
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We have three principal findings.  First, despite the fact that REITs hold mostly tangible
assets and the real estate industry is quite competitive and closer to having constant returns to
scale than other industries, we do not find a statistical link between REIT investment and
traditional accounting-based measures of q.  
Second, in stark contrast, we find a strong and statistically significant relationship
between REIT investment and our appraisal-based measure of q.  Using our appraisal-based
measure of q, we estimate that a REIT that starts the year with a q of 1.1 will be 4.3 percent
larger after one year than if it starts the year with a q of 1.0.  Our estimated elasticity is roughly
five times larger than the elasticities typically found in empirical investment studies.
3  The
responsiveness of investment to q is consistent with neoclassical investment theory but
contradicts the view that stock market valuations are not central in explaining investment,
possibly because managers view stock prices as having a non-fundamental component (see, e.g.,
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993)).
Third, we examine the sources of ‘measurement error’ in the traditional measure of q,
which we define as the difference between the appraisal-based measure of q and the traditional
measure of q accounting data.  This measurement error depends on the vintage of a REIT’s
properties with REITs that have older buildings typically having more measurement error.  It
also varies by property sector (e.g., apartment buildings versus shopping malls) for the REIT.  In
addition, this measurement error varies systematically over time. 
While the magnitude of the coefficients are certainly specific to the real estate industry,
these results suggest that even in an industry where the assumptions of Tobin’s original q-theory4 Goolsbee and Maydew (2002) note that a recent tax policy change can allow many corporations to
generate significant tax savings by spinning-off their real estate holdings into REITs.  Their argument is
based on the claim that corporations own a substantial amount of real estate whose book value is below
its market value.
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are most likely to hold, measurement error in Tobin’s q can still substantially bias downward
estimates of the coefficient on q.  In addition, these results can also be more directly applied to
non-real estate corporations than might at first be obvious because real estate represents a
material portion of the assets for the typical firm.  Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data show that
real estate (separate from equipment) represented more than 25 percent of the assets of non-
financial corporations as of the 4
th quarter of 2002.  Historically, real estate has been even more
important for corporate balance sheets:  In 1992 and 1982, real estate represented more than 30
percent and 40 percent of total corporate assets, respectively.
4  Goolsbee and Maydew (2002)
show that two manufacturing firms, General Electric and General Motors, are in the top seven
(non-real estate) firms with the largest real estate holdings in 2002.  The historical importance of
real estate assets for corporate balance sheets could play a significant role in creating
measurement error for studies of investment and Tobin’s q using data from these years.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background information on REITs. 
Section III reviews previous tests of the q-theory of investment.  The data are summarized in
Section IV.  Section V discusses our empirical methodology and the measurement of q.  Section
VI presents our empirical results on investment and q while section VII provides evidence on the
sources of measurement error.  Section VIII concludes with an agenda for future research.5
II. Background on REITs
With certain key tax-related exceptions, REITs are similar to other corporations.  Like
other firms, REITs often initiate operations by raising capital from external markets and
investing the capital in operating assets.  To qualify as a REIT, among other things, a firm must
meet certain asset and income tests that set minimum levels of real estate activity to prevent
REITs from using their tax-advantaged status to move into other business areas.  REITs must
earn at least 75 percent of their income from real estate related investments and 95 percent of
their income from these sources as well as dividends, interest and gains from securities sales.  In
addition, at least 75 percent of their assets must be invested in real estate, mortgages, REIT
shares, government securities, or cash.  While older REITs were often passive investors, several
changes in tax rules in the late 1980s allowed  REITs to actively manage their assets during the
1990s.  Although some REITs invest in real estate mortgages, we restrict our focus to equity
REITs, which primarily invest in rental properties.  The relatively straightforward nature of
REITs’ assets (compared to industrial firms) leads many analysts to value REITs by appraising
their properties.  We use one set of these appraisals in our empirical work.  
In addition to the asset and income tests, tax law requires REITs to pay out a minimum
percentage of their taxable income as dividends each year.  For most of our sample period, this
percentage was 95 percent; however, tax changes in 2000 reduced the minimum percentage to 90
percent.  This distribution requirement is based on taxable income rather than financial reporting
income.  Despite this requirement, REITs have some discretionary cash flow because operating
cash flow typically exceeds taxable income, especially since depreciation allowances reduce
taxable income but not cash flow.  In general, however, the distribution requirement limits
REITs’ ability to finance investment with internally generated funds, so they uniformly rely6
more heavily on secondary equity issues than do regular corporations.  Thus, while many studies
of investment focus on the differences in the behavior of firms with and without internally
generated funds, REITs offer less cross-sectional variation in dependence on external funds.
The benefit of qualifying as a REIT is avoiding the double taxation of equity-financed
investment.  Unlike regular corporations, REITs receive an annual tax deduction for dividends
paid out to shareholders.  REITs often distribute all of their taxable income to shareholders each
year, which eliminates the corporate tax altogether.  The lack of double taxation changes the tax
incentives for investment decisions.  As discussed by Summers (1981), Poterba and Summers
(1983), and Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994), tax policy affects the construction of q as a
measure of the incentive for a firm to invest.  Since REITs are exempt from the corporate tax,
the corporate tax does not affect their q. 
III.  Stock Prices and Investment
This section reviews the theory and empirical evidence on how stock prices affect
investment.  Our comparative advantage is using better data so we do not provide an exhaustive
review of the previous econometric methodology.  Many studies of investment start with the
insight of Tobin’s (1969) q model of investment that a firm will want to invest if the market
value of a project exceeds its replacement value.  The ratio of the market value to the
replacement value is called q.  If the output market is perfectly competitive and the production
technology has constant returns to scale, Hayashi (1982) shows that Tobin’s original hypothesis
implies that the firm will invest if the market value of the firm exceeds the replacement value of
the firm.  The difference between these two statements is that the former applies to marginal q5 Among the contributions on the role of adjustment costs in models of investment, see Lucas and
Prescott (1971) and Mussa (1977).  The functional form of the adjustment costs affects the predicted
relationship between investment and q.  A common functional form choice is quadratic adjustment costs
because it implies a linear specification between investment and q and the parameter estimates can be
interpreted as measures of the cost of adjustment.  Unfortunately, as discussed by Erickson and Whited
(2000), the linear specification of investment and q is consistent with a broader class of adjustment cost
functions than just quadratic adjustment costs.  Thus, using the parameters as estimates of adjustment
costs requires a specific functional form choice.
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but the latter refers to average q.  These conditions eliminate economic profits on inframarginal
investments so that the firm’s marginal project has the same value as its average project. 
For empirical work on investment, the theory must be adjusted so that the capital stock
does not immediately move to its optimal level where the firm faces no marginal incentive to
invest.  That is, the simplest view of q theory is that it provides a condition for the equilibrium
capital stock but does not describe the dynamics of the investment process.  To implement q
theory empirically, adjustment costs have been added to the theory.
5  With adjustment costs, the
benefits of investment as measured by q are traded off against the non-linear costs of investing.  
For empirical work, q theory has the implication that q is a sufficient statistic for the
value of investing.  That is, q fully captures the firm’s incentive to invest so the theory predicts a
univariate relationship between investment and q.  The functional form of this relationship
depends on the form of adjustment costs.  However, the regression equation does not need other
variables.  Despite the simple relationship predicted by theory, as discussed in more detail
below, the poor econometric performance of this univariate relationship has led researchers to
augment q regressions with other variables, most commonly with cash flow.
In general, early attempts to test q theory in both aggregate and firm-level data found
little support for the theory (see, e.g., Summers, 1981).  The theory failed on several counts. 
First, the estimated responsiveness of investment to q was low and often not statistically8
different from zero; based on common functional form assumptions about adjustment costs, the
point estimates suggested unrealistically high adjustment costs.   Second, the simple regressions
did not explain much of the variation in investment data.  Third, adding other variables to the
regression improved the explanatory power of the regression, which refutes the argument that q
is a sufficient statistic for investment incentives.
The dismal early results did not deter further empirical work because, in part, the simple
elegance of q theory seems inherently logical.  Broadly speaking, researchers blamed the
empirical failure of q theory on measurement error.  This measurement error takes many
different forms.  For example, accounting data only allows for a proxy of the true replacement
cost of the firm.  Accounting data provide historical cost information on previous investment,
typically not adjusted for inflation.  These historical data reflect accounting depreciation which
is a noisy proxy for true economic depreciation.  In addition, while the stock market valuation of
common equity is relatively straightforward, the market value of the firm includes the market
value of debt and preferred equity which are more difficult to measure.  
Also, the theory is stated in terms of the manager’s perception of the value of the firm
and its ideas but the empirical implementation uses the stock market valuation of the firm. 
Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) point out that the manager’s valuation could differ from
the market’s valuation, especially if the stock market has fads or inefficiencies.  Thus, the
standard empirical exercises are based on the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and q theory.
Q-theory calls for marginal q but the initial measures captured, at best, average q.  If
marginal q diverges from average q for any of the reasons described by Hayashi, such as
imperfect competition, then the proxies fail to capture the incentive to invest.  This form of
measurement error led researchers to estimate the marginal value of additional capital.9
Previous research has used many strategies to deal with measurement error.  Assuming
that the measurement error is serially uncorrelated, lagged values of q can be used as instruments
for current values of q (see Blundell, Bond, Devereux, and Schiantarelli, 1992); unfortunately,
many reasons for measurement error in q persist over time which complicates such attempts. 
Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994) argue that tax reforms create surprise innovations in tax-
adjusted q.  Another approach to moving toward marginal q instead of average q is to predict
marginal profits based on variables known by the managers (see, Abel and Blanchard, 1986, and
Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995).  This strategy may help explain why investment is sensitive to
cash flow even after controlling for q, if cash flow contains information about marginal profits
that is not captured by the standard measures of q.  Gilchrist and Himmelberg find that
incorporating cash flow into the measure of ‘fundamental’ q outperforms standard measures of
q, but cash flow still affects investment for firms that may face financial constraints.  Finally,
analysts’ forecasts of earnings could provide information about future profitability.  Cummins,
Hassett, and Oliner (1998) and Bond and Cummins (2000) incorporate these forecasts into
measures of q and estimate a responsiveness of investment to q that is roughly a factor of ten
larger than estimates using traditional measures (e.g., Bond and Cummins find that the
coefficient on q increases from 0.0014 to 0.13).  
Erickson and Whited (2000) attack the measurement error problem in a different way by
creating measurement-error consistent generalized method of moments estimators, using the
higher moments of the distributions to impose restrictions on the data.  With these estimators,
they find that q suffers from substantial measurement error but the consistent estimators imply
that q theory has good explanatory power.  Their estimates suggest a much stronger sensitivity of
investment to stock price changes than in previous work (e.g., the estimated coefficient on q6 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) question the validity of the FHP approach and challenge the FHP results;
see also the rejoinder by FHP (2000) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2001). 
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increases from 0.014 to 0.044), but the elasticities are still relatively modest in economic terms. 
Furthermore, they argue that the importance of cash flow found in some previous research is an
artifact of the measurement error. 
A second line of empirical research on investment is whether q theory holds for some
firms but not others.  Financing constraints may explain the weak relationship between q and 
investment (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988, hereafter FHP).  FHP argue that if
financing constraints affect investment, then q will be less important and cash flow variables will
be more important for explaining the investment of financially-constrained firms than they are
for explaining the behavior of unconstrained firms.  This insight spawned a large literature
(summarized by Hubbard, 1998) on how to identify constrained firms and whether such
regressions shed light on the role of financing constraints for corporate investment.
6  Since all
REITs must pay relatively high dividends and thus go to the financial markets to finance almost
all new investment, we have no cross-sectional variation in the extent of equity-dependence with
which to examine the results of the financing constraints literature.
  Our approach to the measurement error is strikingly simple.  First, we concentrate on real
estate firms – a competitive industry for which the constant returns to scale assumption seems
more reasonable.  Second, the nature of the industry allows us to obtain data on appraisals of the
replacement cost of each firm’s assets.  Instead of relying on accounting data that uses historical
measures of cost, we have fair market value estimates of the replacement cost. 
 7 Industry statistics are from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trust (www.nareit.org).




Our sample period begins in 1992, which corresponds with the beginning of a 5-year
period of strong growth in the REIT industry, and ends in 2002.  The number of equity REITs
grew from 89 in 1992 to 149 in 2002 and their equity market capitalization grew from $11
billion in 1992 to $151 billion in 2002, with a consequent gain in liquidity and trading volume.
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The key variable for our analysis is an alternative measure of Tobin’s q that is based on
private appraisals--estimates of the market value of each REIT’s assets.  We rely on Net Asset
Value (NAV) estimates from Green Street Advisors, Inc to construct this alternative measure of
q, referred to as NAV-q below.  In estimating NAV, Green Street assesses the value of the major
properties of a REIT and subtracts the liabilities of the REIT.  Green Street’s goal is to compare
the market value of the REIT’s common stock with the market value of the underlying assets
(after adjusting for other ownership claims).  They use these estimates to advise clients (often
large institutional investors) on selecting REITs as investments.  While Green Street provides
NAV estimates for 40 percent of equity REITs in 2001, the firms they cover represent 75 percent
of REIT value.
8
Several factors motivate using the Green Street NAV estimates.  Industry observers and
participants almost uniformly agree that Green Street produces the most careful and accurate
estimates in the REIT industry.  It is the only analyst firm to have a consistent set of estimates
prior to 1996.  Green Street focuses exclusively on real estate firms and each of its analysts
follows only a few firms.  These analysts specialize by type of property and compute NAV by9 One complication that we face is that many REITs operate as UPREITs, or umbrella partnership REITs
(see Sinai and Gyourko, 2002, for details regarding the UPREIT structure).  UPREITs have a separate
class of stakeholders who own partnership units that are freely convertible one-for-one into REIT
common shares.  These partnership units arise when investors contribute appreciated properties to the
umbrella partnership in exchange for partnership units, deferring any unrealized capital gains taxes on the
properties.  The partnership units are essentially equivalent to REIT shares, so we include equity in the
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determining the fair market value of each property owned by a REIT, often visiting larger
properties.  Finally, Green Street performs no investment banking functions for REITs, so it is
immune from the potential conflicts of interest that may impact the research of banks that
underwrite securities.
Over this sample period, the mean (median) share-price-to-NAV ratio is 1.04 (1.01). 
While the central tendency of this ratio is close to one, there is substantial variation both over
 time and within time periods.  Figure 1 plots the 25
th percentile, median, and 75
th percentile
price/NAV ratio by month for 1992-2002.  The time series plot reveals a strong industry-wide
component to the price/NAV ratio with the median value exceeding 1.20 for all of 1997 but
being below 0.9 for most of 2000.  Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) argue that this industry-wide
component represents a form of investor sentiment for REITs.  The spread between the 25
th and
75
th percentile of the monthly distribution has narrowed over time. 
In addition to the NAV estimates from Green Street, we obtain accounting data from
SNL Securities, Inc. and data on share prices from the University of Chicago’s Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  We use the accounting data to measure investment activity,
the book value of debt and preferred equity, and cash flow.  The SNL data also provide industry-
specific information that are not available from broad-based accounting databases, such as
Compustat, including the number of operating partnership units in the ownership structure and
the net investment in real estate.
9  All variables are measured on an annual basis.form of the partnership units when computing the market value of equity.  These partnership units are
reported as a minority interest on the balance sheet and typically dominate that category of financing.
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Our sample includes 91 REITs and real estate companies covered by Green Street
between 1992-2002.  Overall, after matching with SNL data and restricting the sample to US
equity REITs, we obtain information on 83 REITs and 481 firm-years with non-missing data.
V. Empirical Specification and Measurement of q






=    +   q  + 
K
α βε
where I/K is the rate of investment during the period (the ratio of investment during year t to the
end of year t - 1 capital stock), q is a measure of firm-specific Tobin’s q at the beginning of the
period, " is a constant, $ is the sensitivity of investment to q, and , is the error term.  The
empirical model often includes year-effects, firm-effects, or both. 





E   +  D   +  PE
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where E is the market value of common equity, D is the book value of debt which is a proxy for
the market value of debt (some authors have attempted to adjust the book value of debt so that it
better reflects the market value), PE is the book value of preferred equity (again taken as a proxy10 We do not adjust our measure of q for taxes.  The lack of a corporate-level tax on REITs implies that
any tax adjustment must use the appropriate shareholder tax rate.  The standard tax adjustments for q
reflect how the tax system affects the cost of acquiring new assets.  Based on the results in Gentry,
Kemsley and Mayer (2003), one could argue for adjusting the market value of REIT equity relative to the
net asset value due to the capitalization of future shareholder taxes into share prices.  Specifically, Gentry,
Kemsley and Mayer find that, conditional on a REIT’s NAV, the market value of its equity increases with
the amount of tax basis that remains in its assets.  This tax capitalization effect could affect our measured
q but would not be relevant for the REIT’s marginal incentive to invest.  Our results are invariant to
whether or not we make such a correction.  Results with a tax-adjusted q are available upon request.
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for the market value), and BVA is the book value of the firm’s assets.  The book value of assets
represents the replacement cost of the firm’s assets.  
As discussed above, using historical accounting data as a proxy for the replacement value
induces measurement error in q.  We compare the traditional measure of q to an alternative
NAV-based q, which we compute by using estimates of the net asset value for the REIT in the
denominator for q.
10  To obtain the gross value of assets so that the numerator and denominator
of our measure of q are consistent, we add the book value of debt, preferred equity, and other
liabilities (as a proxy for the market value of these variables) to the aggregate value of the
REIT’s NAV to get an estimate of the replacement cost of the REIT’s assets.  This NAV-based q
assumes that REITs can buy more properties or sell its existing buildings at the current price of
its buildings.  The ability to sell buildings at the appraised value seems natural (provided the
appraisals are fair).  For positive investment, the REITs could purchase buildings from existing
building owners or from real estate developers.  Neither our measure of NAV q nor traditional
accounting-based measures of q capture the incentives of real estate developers to build new
buildings. 
Following previous studies of investment, we augment equation (1) with cash flow
variables.  As discussed in Section III, a common interpretation of the estimated coefficient on
the cash flow variable is that it reflects the importance of financing constraints.  However,11 We subtract an estimate of the required dividend rather than the actual dividend because REITs often
distribute a larger dividend than is required by the tax rule.  We are examining the choice and timing of
these discretionary dividends versus share repurchases in a related paper (Gentry and Mayer, 2003).
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Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) note that this interpretation is not valid if q is measured poorly
and cash flow provides incremental information about future profitability (see Abel and Eberly,
2002 for a theoretical model in which cash flow serves as an indicator of future investment
opportunities).  The Gilchrist and Himmelberg argument suggests that if measurement error
drives the estimated coefficients on cash flow, then better measures of q should reduce the
importance of the cash flow variables.  We focus on this hypothesis in comparing specifications
that use traditional and NAV-based measures of q.
The dividend distribution requirement for REITs complicates the measurement of cash
flow, but also provides an additional opportunity to explore why cash flow is often associated
with investment.  Typically, cash flow is measured as operating cash flows for the firm before
dividends since dividends are a discretionary use of funds.  REITs do not have complete
discretion over dividends because tax rules require a minimum dividend.  In our empirical
specifications, we use two alternative cash flow measures.  For comparison with previous
research, we use the standard operating cash flow measure before dividends.  We also
decompose cash flow into two parts, an estimate of the minimum required dividend (95 percent
of financial net income before 2000 and 90 percent for 2000 and afterwards) and the remaining
cash flow reflecting discretionary funds.
11  We do not observe the actual required dividend as
firms do not consistently report their taxable net income, which would be necessary to compute
the actual required dividend, although we expect that GAAP net income is a good proxy for most
firms.  Discretionary cash flow after the required dividend proxies for internal resources that12 The difference between these two measures is that the change in total assets includes changes in the
cash (or liquid asset) position of the REIT, while the change in net investment in real estate focuses
specifically on investment in properties.
16
may mitigate financing constraints.  To the extent that the required dividend helps predict
investment, it may be evidence in favor of the hypothesis that cash flow captures an unobserved
component in profitability since REITs cannot use these funds to pay for the investment.  We
scale all cash flow variables by the total assets at the end of the preceding year.
We define REIT investment as the percentage change in total assets during the year.  We
also develop an alternative measure of investment based on changes in real estate assets, which
is closer to the property, plant and equipment definition of investment that is most common in
the literature.
12  Our investment results are not sensitive to how we define investment.  We
choose to use the broader measure of investment in most of the analysis because we will be able
to decompose the financing of that investment, as below.  
In general, REITs are not construction companies and most of their acquisitions are from
previously developed projects.  Most REIT investment involves buying and selling existing
buildings, as well as making capital improvements to their existing buildings.  Nonetheless,
some REITs have joint ventures arrangements with developers or directly construct new
buildings themselves.  While REITs often buy existing assets, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)
show that between 10 and 43.5 percent of annual general corporate investment between 1970
and 2000 is spent on used equipment or involves the merger of two companies.  Thus an
appreciable portion of investment for industrial companies also involves investment in existing
assets.  Nonetheless, the usual discussion of adjustment costs may have a limited application for
REITs since REITs do not typically use their buildings as a factor of production, but instead13 For the full sample (including observations with net investment greater than 100 percent), the median
(mean) net investment rate is 12 (24) percent.
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lease their buildings to tenants.  Thus many of the buildings would have a very similar value to a
non-REIT owner who would likely use the building in a similar manner as the REIT itself. 
Adjustment costs are likely limited to the direct cost of selling the building plus any indirect
costs associated with the difficulties of selling a building when the existing owner has more
information about the building than an outside buyer would have. (See Genesove, 1993, for
evidence of the impact of adverse selection on the prices of used cars.)
VI. Results
Table I provides summary statistics for the variables used in our base regressions.  In
order to minimize the effects of firms going through major changes, such as mergers, our base
specification restricts the sample to REITs with annual net investment rates (as opposed to gross
investment rates that would include replacement investment) of less than 100 percent of the
previous capital stock (Panel A), reducing the sample size by 23 observations.  The median
(mean) net investment rate is 10 (18) percent in this restricted sample, which is consistent with
the rapid growth in the industry.
13   Panel B shows summary statistics for the entire sample with
all REITs.
For the traditional accounting-based measure of q, the median value in our sample is
1.28; however, the median appraisal-based q is only 1.02.  The difference between these median
values suggests that measures of q based on historical cost overstate the true value of q (i.e.,
accounting depreciation rates exceed economic depreciation rates or properties may appreciate in
value).  For regression analysis, however, the critical issue is not the level of the18
mismeasurement of q but how the measurement error varies across observations.  The
distribution of the appraisal-based measure of q is much less variable than the distribution of the
accounting-based measure of q.  The standard deviation of the NAV q is 0.12 compared to a
standard deviation of 0.41 for the traditional measure, which suggests that the NAV-based
measure is less noisy.
The cash flow measures show that the median REIT generates approximately 7.3 percent
of assets in cash flow every year.  However, the median REIT must payout a dividend of
approximately 3.2 percent of assets.  The remaining cash flow, which is available due to
depreciation allowances and other non-cash expenses that reduce taxable income, can be retained
or paid out as an additional dividend at the discretion of management.
Table II presents the results of estimating several investment equations using the
traditional measure of q and cash flow.  In column (1), the estimated coefficient on traditional q
(0.028) is typical or even slightly higher than that found in most investment studies.  This
estimate is not statistically different from zero, although our sample is considerably smaller than
usual sample sizes in other studies of industrial firms.  The specification in the second column
includes year and firm fixed effects as is also common in previous studies.  With the inclusion of
these fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on traditional q becomes negative but not
statistically different from zero.  Thus, despite the real estate industry arguably being closer to
constant returns to scale and more competitive than most other industries, investment regressions
with traditional measures of q do not indicate a statistically significant relationship between
Tobin’s q and investment.  
For the specifications in the first two columns, we find large and statistically significantly
different from zero estimated coefficients on cash flow, consistent with previous research on14Decomposing the cash flow variable into separate components leads to slightly lower estimated effects
of q on investment but these estimated coefficients remain statistically insignificant.
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industrial firms.  Unlike industrial firms, however, REITs face restrictions on reinvesting their
cash flow since the tax law requires them to pay almost all of their taxable income as dividends.
While the portion of cash flow that must be paid as a dividend may contain information about
the profitability of the firm, this cash flow cannot be used to fund investment.  To further explore
the role of cash flow on investment, the specifications in the third and fourth columns
decompose the cash flow measure into a required dividend portion and cash flow in excess of the
required dividend portion.  For the specifications without and with year and firm fixed effects,
the estimated coefficients on the required dividend is higher than the coefficient on remaining
cash flow and an F-test rejects equality of the estimated coefficients of the two types of cash
flow at the 99 percent confidence level.  The larger coefficient on the required dividend, which is
equal to 90 or 95 percent of net income, but cannot be retained by the firm, suggests that an
important part of the correlation between cash flow and investment is driven by the association
of cash flow with current earnings and also the future prospects of the firm.
14 
Table III presents comparable specifications that use NAV-based q instead of traditional
q.  Across the board, relative to the estimates using the traditional measure of q, the estimated
sensitivity of investment to NAV-based q is much larger in magnitude and statistically different
than zero at conventional significance levels.  For investment, the estimated coefficient on NAV
q ranges from 0.37 to 0.70.  Furthermore, for the specification without fixed effects, the
explanatory power of the regression (the adjusted-R
2) more than doubles when using the NAV-
based q when compared with Table II.  These estimated effects imply that REIT investment is
highly sensitive to q as a proxy for investment opportunities when q is measured more20
accurately.  For example, using the estimate of 0.43 from the specification in the second column
of Table III, a REIT that started the year with a q of 1.1 would be 4.3 percent larger than if it had
started the year with a q of 1.0.
A natural question is how our estimates of the responsiveness of investment to the
appraisal-based measure of q compare to estimates in the previous literature.  Even among
papers that argue in support of q theory, our estimates are relatively large.  For example,
Erickson and Whited (2000) report ordinary least squares estimates of around 0.014 but
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimates of between 0.033 and 0.045.  Bond and
Cummins (2000) report estimates using traditional measures of around 0.014 but their estimates
using analysts forecasts of earnings to construct q range from 0.104 to 0.139.  However, our
estimates are more similar to those found by Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994).  They
report a vast array of estimated coefficients for q based on different years, under the hypothesis
that years around tax reforms provide better measured values of q; for the major tax reform years
of 1962, 1972, 1981, and 1986 using GMM estimators, they report estimated q coefficients of
0.585, 0.136, 0.262, and 0.245, respectively (taken from Table 4 of their paper).
Comparing estimated coefficients across papers is complicated because empirical
methodology and sample design differ across studies.  Most studies of investment include a
variety of industries while focusing on manufacturing firms, but we focus exclusively on real
estate firms so that the sensitivities may not be directly comparable.  The real estate industry
may face lower adjustment costs than other industries so that REITs may respond quickly,
possibly by buying existing properties.  However, if industry differences were the sole
explanation for our result, one would expect that the traditional measures of q would also yield
large estimated investment sensitivities but we only find the large sensitivities when we use the15 When we decompose cash flow into the discretionary component and the minimum dividend in
columns (3) and (4) the coefficient on the required dividend falls much more (relative to the Table II
estimates with traditional q) than the coefficient on the discretionary portion of cash flow.  This difference
suggests that the relationship between cash flow and measurement error in q depends on the future
prospects of firm.  
16 The relatively large size of the cash flow coefficients in our work relative to other papers in the fixed
effects specification may reflect the relatively low variation in cash flow within a given REIT over time.
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appraisal-based measure of q.  While such appraisal-based measures are unavailable for other
industries, our results can be taken as support for the claim that measurement error in q is a
major hurdle for empirical work on investment.
Examining other variables in the investment equation, we find that the inclusion of NAV
q reduces the estimated coefficient on cash flow by forty percent in the specification without
fixed effects and by about ten percent in the specification with fixed effects.  This result
indicates that measurement error in q is an important factor in explaining the significance of cash
flow in investment equations, which is consistent with the findings of Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), amongst others.
15  Nonetheless, the estimated coefficient on cash flow is still positive
and statistically significant.
16  While the statistical significance of the coefficient on cash flow
may suggest that our NAV-based measure of q suffers from some measurement error, it is also
consistent with Abel and Eberly’s (2002) model in which cash flow is positively correlated with
investment, even when q is measured accurately.  Two features of REITs suggest they may be
good candidates for Abel and Eberly’s model.  First, Abel and Eberly do not assume convex
adjustment costs, which is reasonable for REITs since they can plausibly just as easily sell
buildings as buy them.  Second, Abel and Eberly argue that the correlation between cash flow
and investment should be larger for small, fast growing firms, such as the REITs in our sample.  22
Table IV examines three robustness checks of these results.  The first two columns re-run
re-run the fixed effects regressions for both measures of q without restricting the sample to
observations with net investment less than 100 percent.  This change in sample increases the
sample by 23 observations but has only a modest effect on the estimated coefficients on q; in
contrast, the estimated coefficients on cash flow increase dramatically.  As an alternative method
for dealing with these outliers in investment, we use robust regressions to downweight outliers
based on the goodness of fit rather than based on an arbitrary cutoff.  We report the robust
regression results for the two measures of q in the third and fourth columns of Table IV.  Again,
the estimated coefficients on q are quite similar to those found in the restricted sample; robust
regression does, however, reduce the magnitude of the estimated cash flow coefficients.  Overall,
excluding outliers in net investment does not appear to drive our estimates of the relation 
between q and investment.
We also explore outliers along a different dimension: observations with unusually low or
high values of q.  In the last two columns of Table IV, we present results for a sample that
excludes the observations with the lowest and highest one percent of the relevant measure of q
for each regression.  While this restriction has little effect on the estimated coefficient on
traditional q, the estimated coefficient on NAV-q more than doubles to 0.93 (column 6) from
0.39 (column 2).  One possible explanation for this change is that the actual relationship between
investment and q is stronger than suggested by the results in Table III but some observations for
NAV-q suffer from measurement error that attenuates the estimated effect.
We also consider the possibility that our measure of investment might be too broad
relative to the previous literature.  While REITs are required to restrict their investment to real
estate and real estate-related activities, they can have a portion of their holdings in financial17 To save space, these results are available from the authors upon request.
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assets such as government securities.  REITs may systematically vary the portion of their
investment in real estate versus other assets in response to changes in q.  Our results are virtually
unchanged when we use a more limited measure of investment that includes only real estate
assets
17  Thus, the investment findings appear to be driven by investment in properties rather
than investment in cash or securities.
VII. Determinants of Measurement Error in Tobin’s q
Our results suggest that an NAV-based Tobin’s q generates much larger investment
sensitivity than the traditional accounting-based measure of q.  Under the assumption that our
NAV q is a more precise measure of q than the traditional measure of  q, we model the
measurement error (0) in q as the difference between NAV q and traditional q as follows:
() NAV Trad
it it it = q  - q η
In most cases, 0 is less than zero because the sample mean of traditional q is 1.35, while the
mean of NAV q is 1.04.  
As discussed above, the literature has mentioned a wide variety of reasons that
investment is not very sensitive to changes in traditional q, including market power, increasing
returns to scale, difficulties in valuing intangible assets or measuring the replacement cost of
assets, and adjustment costs.  Of these factors, the most likely problem for REITs is that the
book value of capital does not equal the replacement cost of capital, possibly because the market
value of assets in place can often rise of fall substantially based on changes in supply or demand18 The data on average age are missing for two REITs in 2001.
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for buildings in particular markets and for specific property types, as well as time series trends in
the overall rate of property price inflation.
We examine the possibility of vintage and property sector effects by regressing the
measurement error (0) on the average age of a REIT’s properties, the average age squared, and
the property sector of the REIT in Table V.  We are only able to measure the average age of a
REIT’s properties for a single year (2001), so we have a single cross-section of 57 REITs.
18  The
results in column (1) are consistent with vintage effects having a large and statistically
significant impact on the measurement error in q.  The coefficient on average age is positive,
while the coefficient on age squared is negative.  The coefficients suggest that REITs with an
average age of about 23 years have the largest measurement error in q, or alternatively, have the
biggest difference between the book value and the market value of the assets.  
Columns (2) and (3) add controls for UPREITs and the primary property sector for each
REIT.  UPREITs are REITs that acquire some of their properties through a partnership
transaction in which a private owner of properties contributes the properties to the REIT and
receives partnership units that are convertible into common shares of the REITs.  This
transaction avoids capital gains taxes for the contributor and is thus particularly attractive to
owners of buildings that have a large difference between book value and market value and thus
large potential capital gains.  Not surprisingly, UPREITs have a much larger measurement error
in q.  Finally, the property sector can also have a big impact on measurement error as actual
depreciation (and appreciation) rates of assets can vary across these various sectors.19 The equity market capitalization of the REIT industry grew from $32 Billion in 1993 to $140 Billion in
1997 as REITs embarked on an acquisition boom.  During this entire period, the mean NAV q for our
sample always exceeded unity.
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Finally, we examine how the impact of measurement error in q changes over time. 
Figure 2 shows the mean value of traditional q and NAV q, by year, from 1993-2002.  Clearly
the difference between these series exhibits a strong time series pattern.  The value of
measurement error was at its highest at the beginning of the sample when there were few REITs
in existence.  The typical REIT in the sample in 1992 had acquired many assets in the 1980s
when accelerated depreciation was common, artificially driving the book value of real estate
assets relative to the market value.  From 1993 to 1997, the mean measurement error began to
fall as REITs acquired new assets whose market value and book value were naturally quite
similar.
19  After 1997, REITs stopped acquiring many new properties as their value of q fell. 
Between 1998-2000, commercial real estate prices continued to rise even though the book value
of REIT assets fell due to the inevitable effect of depreciation.  Finally, the value of
measurement error stabilized as commercial real estate values have leveled-off or even fallen
slightly during the recent recession.
This time series pattern in the measurement error in q has been removed from our
investment results in some of the specifications in Tables 2-4 by the inclusion of time dummies. 
However, the time dummies wipe out an important source of variation in the measurement error
in q.  Years when NAV q were high were also years when REITs acquired most of their
properties.  While the remaining variation across firms over time is enough to find a large
coefficient on NAV q, the coefficient on NAV q would be more than twice as big (0.91 versus
0.37) if we were to drop the time dummies and keep the firm fixed effects.26
VIII. Conclusion
REITs provide a good opportunity to examine how investment decisions respond to
Tobin’s q.  In this paper, we compare the sensitivity of investment to a traditional measure of q,
constructed with accounting based measures of the replacement cost of assets, and a NAV-based
estimate of  q that is computed using appraisals.  Investment equations using the accounting-
based measure of q yield small and imprecise parameter estimates on q, consistent with results
from naive estimation strategies using the broader spectrum of firms.  In contrast, investment is
quite sensitive to the appraisal-based measure of q, with parameter estimates considerably larger
than the values found by studies that use econometric methods to improve the measurement of q. 
For example, REITs with a Tobin’s q of 1.1 will increase its assets by 4.3 percent during the year
relative to a REIT with a q value of 1.0.  In addition, we find that the difference between the
alternative measures of q (which we refer to as measurement error) depends on the vintage of a
firm’s assets and the specific types of property it owns.
Given our focus on the real estate industry, our results are not directly comparable to
previous studies.  Nevertheless, the difference in results across the two measures of q indicates
that problems in measuring q can have major implications for estimated parameters, even in an
industry which meets many of the assumptions made in Tobin’s original paper.  Furthermore,
given that real estate comprises at lease 25 percent of the assets of the average non-financial
firm, our results may help explain the poor statistical performance of traditional measures of q in
other, broader studies. 
Our results suggest several avenues for further research.  First, REITs vary in whether
they acquire existing properties or engage in joint ventures that develop new properties; this27
variation may provide more information on how adjustment costs vary across types of
investment.  Second, empirical tests of the q theory of investment assume that the value of equity
relative to the replacement cost of assets reflects real investment opportunities of the firm.  In
contrast, if stock prices are subject to “fads,” then the difference between the stock market value
and the value of underlying assets might present an investment opportunity for investors and for
the firm but the value-maximizing response would not involve real investment.  Instead, when
the share price is relatively high, the firm could issue shares and reduce its debt; when the share
price is relatively low, the firm could borrow and repurchase shares.  Finally, we can use the
NAV-based estimates of q to look for non-linearities in the responsiveness of investment to q.  In
particular, agency problems might lead managers to be more willing to increase the size of the
firm when q is high but be unwilling to shrink the size of the firm (through property sales or
other types of disinvestment) when q is low.28
References
Abel, Andrew B. And Olivier J. Blanchard.  1986.  “The Present Value of Profits and Cyclical
Movements in Investment.” Econometrica 54(2): 249-273.
Abel, Andrew B. And Janice Eberly.  2002.  “Q Theory Without Adjustment Costs and Cash
Flow Effects Without Financing Constraints.” University of Pennsylvania mimeo.
Baker, Malcolm, Jeremy Stein, and Jeffrey Wurgler.  2001.  “When Does the Market Matter?
Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms.”  Harvard University
mimeo.
Blanchard, Olivier J., Changyoung Rhee, and Lawrence H. Summers.  1993.  “The Stock
Market, Profit, and Investment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 115-136.
Blundell, Richard, Stephen Bond, Michael Devereux, and Fabio Schiantarelli.  1992.  “Invetment
and Tobin’s Q: Evidence from Company Panel Data.”  Journal of Econometrics 51: 233-
257.
Bond, Stephen R. and Jason G. Cummins.  2000.  “The Stock Market and Investment in the New
Economy: Some Tangible Facts and Intangible Fictions.”  Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity no. 1 (2000): 61-108.
Clayton, Jim and Greg MacKinnon, 2000, Explaining the discount to NAV in REIT Pricing:
Noise or information? Working Paper, University of Cincinnati.
Cummins, Jason G., Kevin A. Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard.  “A Reconsideration of
Investment Behavior Using Tax Reforms as Natural Experiments.”  Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity no. 2 (1994): 1-59.
Cummins, Jason G., Kevin A. Hassett, and Stephen D. Oliner.  1998.  “Investment Behavior,
Observable Expectations, Internal Funds.”   Manuscript.  New York University.
Erickson, Timothy and Toni M. Whited.  2000.  “Measurement Error and the Relationship
between Investment and Q.”  Journal of Political Economy 108: 1027-1057.
Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen.  1988.  “Financing Constraints
and Corporate Investment.”  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity no. 1 (1988): 141-
195.
Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen.  2000.  “Investment-Cash Flow
Sensitivities are Useful: A Comment.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 695-705.
Genesove, David.  1993. “Averse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market.” The Journal of
Political Economy, 101(4): 644-665.29
Gentry, William, Charles Jones, and Christopher Mayer. 2003. “Deviations Between Stock Price
and Fundamental Value for Real Estate Investment Trusts,” Wharton School mimeo,
March.
Gentry, William M., Deen Kemsley, and Christopher J. Mayer.  2003. “Dividend Taxes and
Share Prices: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts.” Journal of Finance, 58(1):
261-282.
Gentry, William M. and Christopher J. Mayer.  2003. “The Effects of Share Prices Relative to
‘Fundamental’ Value on Stock Issuances and Repurchases,” Wharton School mimeo,
March.
Gilchrist, Simon and Charles P. Himmelberg.  1995.  “Evidence on the Role of Cash Flow in
Reduced-Form Investment Equations.”  Journal of Monetary Economics 36:541-572.
Goolsbee, Austan and Edward Maydew.  2002.  “Taxes and Organizational Form: The Case of
REIT Spin-Offs.”  National Tax Journal, 55(3):441-456.
Hayashi, Fumio.  1982.  “Tobin’s Marginal q and Average Q: A Neoclassical Interpretation.”
Econometrica 50(1): 213-224.
Hubbard, R. Glenn.  1998.  “Capital Market Imperfections and Investment.”  Journal of
Economic Literature 36: 193-225.
Kaplan, Steven N. And Luigi Zingales.  1997.  “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide
Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 169-
215.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., and Edward C. Prescott.  1971.  “Investment under Uncertainty.” 
Econometrica 39: 659-681.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1990. The Stock Market and
Investment: Is the Market a Sideshow? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 157-
202.
Mussa, Michael L.  “External and Internal Adjustment Costs and the Theory of Aggregate and
Firm Investment.”  Economica 44: 163-178.
Poterba, James M. and Lawrence H. Summers.  1983.  “Dividend Taxes, Corporate Investment
and ‘Q.’” Journal of Public Economics 22: 135-167.
Sinai, Todd and Joseph Gyourko.  2002.  “The Asset Price Incidence of Capital Gains Taxes:
Evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and Publicly-Traded Real Estate Firms.”
Mimeo.  Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.30
Summers, Lawrence H.  1981.  “Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory Approach.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity no. 1 (1981): 67-127.
Tobin, James. 1969.  “A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory.”  Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 1: 15-29.Table I: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Net Investment < 100%
N Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Traditional q    458 1.35 1.27 0.41
NAV q 458 1.04 1.01 0.12
Change in Assets: (Assets t - Assets t-1)/Assets t-1: 458 0.18 0.10 0.22
Cash flow from operating activities: 
Cash Flow t/Assetst-1
458 0.071 0.073 0.034
Cash flow from operating activities less Required
Dividend:
(Cash Flow t - Required Dividend t)/Assetst-1
458 0.036 0.040 0.031
Required Dividend t / Assetst-1 458 0.035 0.032 0.024
Average Age (year = 2001 only) 57 16.6 16.2 7.0
UPREIT = 1 458 0.77 1 0.42
Property = Diversified / Other 458 0.08 0 0.27
Property = Hotel 458 0.02 0 0.14
Property = Industrial 458 0.05 0 0.21
Property = Office 458 0.15 0 0.35
Property = Residential 458 0.31 0 0.46
Property = Retail 458 0.34 0 0.48
Property = Self-Storage 458 0.05 0 0.2332
Panel B: Whole Sample
N Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Traditional q    481 1.36 1.28 0.42
NAV q 481 1.04 1.02 0.12
Change in Assets: (Assets t - Assets t-1)/Assets t-1: 481 0.24 0.12 0.38
Cash flow from operating activities: 
Cash Flow t/Assetst-1
481 0.074 0.074 0.038
Cash flow from operating activities less Required
Dividend:
(Cash Flow t - Required Dividend t)/Assetst-1
481 0.038 0.042 0.033
Required Dividend t / Assetst-1 481 0.036 0.033 0.025
Average Age (year = 2001 only) 57 16.6 16.2 7.0
UPREIT = 1 481 0.77 1 0.42
Property = Diversified / Other 481 0.08 0 0.27
Property = Hotel 481 0.02 0 0.14
Property = Industrial 481 0.05 0 0.21
Property = Office 481 0.16 0 0.37
Property = Residential 481 0.31 0 0.46
Property = Retail 481 0.33 0 0.47
Property = Self-Storage 481 0.05 0 0.2233
Table II:
Base Specification with Traditional q
Dependent Variable: ) Total Assets































Year and firm effects No Yes No Yes
R
2 0.13 0.53 0.14 0.54
F-Test (p-value)* 0.0043 0.0069
N 458 458 458 458
Note: Includes observations for all firm-years with change in total assets of less than 100% in
one year.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
* - The F-test is on the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the Cash Flow less Required
Dividend and Required Dividend variables are equal.34
Table III:
Base Specification with NAV q
Dependent Variable: ) Total Assets































Year and firm effects No Yes No Yes
R
2 0.25 0.54 0.25 0.55
F-Test (p-value)* 0.9403 0.0642
N 458 458 458 458
Note: Includes observations for all firm-years with change in total assets of less than 100% in
one year.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
* - The F-test is on the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the Cash Flow less Required
Dividend and Required Dividend variables are equal.35
Table IV:
Regression Results and Outliers
Dependent Variable: ) Total Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation OLS OLS Robust Robust OLS OLS








































Year and firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 481 481 481 481 471 471
* - The sample excludes the top and bottom 1% of observations with respect to Traditional q (Column 5) and NAV q (Column 6).  
Standard errors are in parentheses.36
Table V:
Decomposition of Measurement Error






































2 0.089 0.309 0.469
N5 7 5 7 5 7
Standard errors are in parentheses.37
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